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I. INTRODUCTION
At the request of the European Commission, the Gallup
Organization surveyed businesses throughout the European Union to
determine if companies are deterred from engaging in cross-border
transactions due to the varying contract laws of the Member States. 1
The survey found that companies not engaged in cross-border
transactions consider different contract laws to be a significant
obstacle. 2 Of the companies surveyed, microenterprises (companies
of nine or fewer employees) are more likely to be deterred from
cross-border trading than larger companies by the complexities of
navigating different contract laws. 3 The companies surveyed
responded favorably to the proposal of a common European sales
law, and over seventy percent of those surveyed indicated they
would likely apply the proposed common law to facilitate cross-

1. See European Contract Law in Business-to-Business Transactions:
Analytical
Report,
EUROPEAN
COMM’N
4–6
(2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_320_en.pdf [hereinafter Analytical
Report 2011] (noting that businesses considered there to be several obstacles to
cross-border trade, such as taxes and licensing, but narrowing the study to
obstacles created by contract law).
2. See id. at 6 (explaining that about forty-nine percent of the companies
surveyed thought that contract law created barriers in at least one of four ways:
“(1) difficulty in agreeing on the applicable foreign contract law; (2) difficulty in
finding out about the provisions of a foreign contract law; (3) problems in
resolving cross-border conflicts, including costs of litigation abroad; and (4)
obtaining legal advice on foreign contract law”).
3. See id. at 4, 8, 25 (explaining that many businesses surveyed did not then
participate in cross-border transactions and reported that a reason for not engaging
in cross-border transactions was due to contract law variations). But see Response
of Allen & Overy LLP, London to the Call for Evidence Issued Jointly by the
Ministry of Justice and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills in
Relation to “A Common European Sales Law for the European Union – A
proposal for a Regulation from the European Commission”, ALLEN & OVERLY
LLP (May 21, 2012), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/
AO_Response_to_MoJ_CESL_Call_for_Evidence_10853.pdf [hereinafter Allen &
Overy’s Response] (taking issue with the study conducted and questioning whether
the CESL is actually needed, in part because of the external factors exerted by
national law, negating the efficacy of the CESL, and in part because cross-border
approaches in the Vienna Convention have been under-utilized).
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border transactions. 4
Concerned about the internal market and based on the Gallup
survey and others, the European Commission (the “Commission”)
published the Proposal for a Regulation on the Common European
Sales Law (the “CESL”) in October 2011. 5 The Commission drafted
the CESL to alleviate the complex decision-making process that
businesses must undergo to conduct business in multiple
jurisdictions, 6 which the Commission believes is particularly
cumbersome for small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”). 7 SMEs
often have the weaker bargaining position when engaging in trade
with larger companies, and the expense of navigating different
contract laws is significant for SMEs with limited resources. 8 Thus,
SMEs generally must use the preferred law of the larger company
when engaging in cross-border trade. 9
4. Analytical Report 2011, supra note 1, at 29 (noting that while some
countries’ businesses indicated stronger levels of support than others, overall, in
twenty-two EU Member States, six in ten businesses were likely to utilize a
common contract scheme).
5. See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, 2011/0284
(COD) at 5 (2011) 635 final (Nov. 10, 2011), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:en:PDF
[hereinafter The Proposal] (noting that as a response to the surveys and Green
Paper on policy options for progress towards a European contract law for
consumers and businesses, the European Parliament issued a Resolution on June 8,
2011 supporting the drafting of a common European sales law).
6. See id. at 2 (explaining that an objective of the CESL is to improve the
internal market by decreasing the complexity that businesses currently face in
navigating the contract law of different jurisdictions). But see Allen & Overy’s
Response, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that the surveys the Commission relied on are
not accurate and that there is no need for a “28th” contract regime).
7. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 3 (indicating that, when businesses,
particularly SMEs, choose not to engage in cross-border trade due to contract
variations, this results in the loss of tens of billions of Euros for the internal
market).
8. See id. (explaining that SMEs are faced with the additional burden of
learning the foreign jurisdiction’s contract law, a burden that requires expenditure
of valuable and limited resources); see also HUGO BEALE ET AL., IUS COMMUNE
CASEBOOKS FOR THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON
CONTRACT LAW 793 (Walter van Gerven ed. 2010) (emphasizing that SMEs are
often in positions similar to those of consumers when dealing with large and
sophisticated parties and may need the same protections as those extended to
consumers).
9. BEALE, supra note 8, at 793; Marco B.M. Loos, Standard Contract Terms
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The Commission explained that existing efforts to harmonize or
create an international legal contract regime, such as through the
Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”), do not serve to ease
the complexity of cross-border transactions. 10 To address the
difficulty and cost of cross-border transactions and improve the
economy, the Commission—with the backing of the European
Parliament—drafted the CESL as an optional instrument. 11 As
explained below, once adopted, the CESL will apply to cross-border
transactions in either a business-to-business (“B2B”) transaction or a
business-to-consumer (“B2C”) transaction. 12 The CESL will serve as
a second contract regime in each Member State, and if one
contracting party is from a Member State and either a SME or a
consumer, the parties can agree to use the CESL as the governing
law of the contract. 13 As a second contract regime for contracting
parties, the CESL is designed to fulfill the Commission’s goal of
promoting cross-border transactions by reducing the complexity of
navigating twenty-seven disjointed contract laws. 14
Regulation in the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law (Univ. of
Amsterdam Cent. for the Study of European Contract Law, Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 2012-04, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2081857.
10. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that because of gaps in the
scope of contract terms like “defect in consent,” current minimum harmonization
standards and the Vienna Convention differ in various jurisdictions, thus leading to
greater complexity and confusion in cross-border transactions).
11. See Policy Option for Progress Towards a European Contract Law for
Consumers and Businesses, Eur. Par. Doc. P7_TA(2011)0262 (2011), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+
P7-TA-2011-0262+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
(“[The
European
Parliament]
[a]cknowledges the need for further progress in the area of contract law and
favours . . . setting up an optional instrument (OI) by means of a regulation.”).
12. See discussion infra Part II(B) (explaining how parties can choose the
CESL as the governing law of their agreement).
13. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 4 (indicating that the purpose of the
CESL regime is to improve cross-border trade for both businesses and consumers
by providing parties with a viable alternative contract regime to national law).
14. See id. (stating that using one contract law throughout the European Union
will reduce both the complexity and cost of cross-border transactions). But see Eric
A. Posner, The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role
of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition 6 (Chi. Inst. For Law and
Econ.,
Working
Paper
No.
597,
2012),
available
at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/wp551-600 (arguing that although one
uniform contract law reduces legal costs, businesses must still weigh the potential
benefits of using national law in a given transaction, and therefore offering the
CESL as an option would add a level of complexity).
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The CESL was proposed in the wake of the economic crisis, and
after over two decades of debate about harmonizing European
contract law. 15 The debate continues with the introduction of the
CESL, and scholars question the form and structure of the CESL.
Some scholars believe that the opt-in provision of the CESL defeats
the purpose of harmonizing the laws, and it only results in the
twenty-eighth contract law that businesses have to consider in crossborder trading. 16 Other scholars focus on provisions enhancing
consumer protection in B2C transactions, 17 the uncertainty the CESL
may create, 18 or how the CESL compares to other contract law
15. See LUCINDA MILLER, THE EMERGENCE OF EU CONTRACT LAW:
EXPLORING EUROPEANIZATION 31–32 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, eds., 2011)
(explaining that European law originally focused more on public rather than
private law and that many questioned whether the EU was competent and
authorized to address issues in private law); see also Martijn W. Hesselink, The
Case for a Common European Sales Law in an Age of Rising Nationalism 8 (Univ.
of Amsterdam Cent. for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper No.
2012-01, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998174 [hereinafter
Hesselink, The Case for a CESL] (questioning the Commission’s motivation in
proposing the CESL as Europeans increasingly resist nationalism in the wake of
the economic crisis).
16. See Posner, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that businesses must analyze the
strategic benefits under both national and EU contract regimes); see also Norbert
Reich, U.S. Traders Take Note: From “Hard” to “Optional Soft Law” in Business
to Consumer Transactions in the European Union, 44 UCC L.J. 189, 5–6 (2012)
(explaining that the optional nature of the CESL creates concerns about whether
the instrument will be attractive enough for parties to choose it over national laws);
Jan M. Smits, Party Choice and the Common European Sales Law, or: How to
Prevent the CESL from Becoming a Lemon on the Law Market 17 (Maastricht
European Private Law Inst., Paper No. 2012/13, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2060017 (arguing that the
CESL needs to be more attractive for businesses to apply it to their transactions by:
(1) making sure the CESL significantly differs from other contract law; (2)
marketing the CESL to businesses and consumers separately to improve
recognition of the benefits; and (3) lowering the costs of applying the CESL).
17. See Bettina Heiderhoff, CESL – A Chance for True Freedom of Contract
for the Consumer, in PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN GERMANY AND IN THE COMMON
EUROPEAN SALES TAX 77, 89–90 (Tim Drygala et al. eds., 2012) (noting that the
CESL provides higher protection for consumers than may be desired because the
transaction cost for sellers may lead to a higher cost in goods for buyers, and
claiming that the CESL fails to protect poorer consumers who cannot understand
the difference between choosing the CESL or national law); see also Posner, supra
note 14, at 7 (indicating that the consumer protections extended by the CESL are
“extensive and are probably more extreme than the rules of many, if not most, of
the EU member states”).
18. See, e.g., Smits, supra note 16, at 17 (predicting that the costs of the
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regimes. 19 Despite criticism, many scholars believe that the CESL
has great potential to serve as a cross-border contract regime. 20 What
have not been thoroughly addressed, however, are the provisions
governing B2B transactions and the protection, or lack thereof, of
SMEs in transactions governed by the CESL.
As written, 21 the CESL deregulates the protections offered in B2B
transactions. The narrow definition of “consumer” provided in the
CESL effectively eliminates national regulations that are in place to
protect SMEs dealing as consumers. 22 This deregulation of protection
offered to SMEs may lead to larger companies preferring and
selecting the CESL as the governing law to the detriment of the
SMEs. 23 This comment argues that the limited definition of
“consumer” and the lack of protection for SMEs in B2B transactions
under the CESL results in deregulation, which is shown through the
application of the CESL to the facts presented in R & B Customs
uncertain application of the CESL, without further improvement, heavily outweigh
any benefits that it would provide to contracting parties); Posner, supra note 14, at
6–7 (arguing that the CESL introduces significant costs to businesses because of
the uncertainty of how it will be applied and that these costs will lead to businesses
not applying the CESL).
19. See generally Loos, supra note 9 (comparing the CESL with the Draft
Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”) and the Vienna Sales Convention
(“CISG”)); see also Nicole Kornet, The Common European Sales Law and the
CISG Complicating or Simplifying the Legal Environment? 14 (Maastricht
European Private Law Inst., Paper No. 2012/4, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012310 (addressing whether the CESL has added value
compared to the use of the CISG in cross-border transactions); Hesselink, The
Case for a CESL, supra note 15, at 7 (explaining that the CESL was adopted to
promote economic growth while attempting to maintain national identities).
20. See Hesselink, The Case for a CESL, supra note 15, at 12 (“[T]he regime
for opting into the CESL, as proposed by the European Commission, is innovative
and generally convincing, although there is still room for improvement.”); see also
Loos, supra note 9 (noting that the CESL makes significant improvements from
previous attempts to harmonize European contract law).
21. This article is based on the October 2011 draft of the CESL.
22. See Loos, supra note 9 (indicating that the narrow definition of consumers
ignores the possibility that some purchasers have a dual purpose for purchasing,
which necessarily limits the applicability of the law).
23. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in
Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law 22–23
(N.Y. Univ. Law and Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 298, 2013), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp (noting that sellers will elect the CESL when they
find Member State contract law to be more restrictive on the particular
transaction).
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Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust Ltd. 24
Part II of this comment addresses the background of the CESL and
how it is intended to regulate cross-border transactions. Subsection A
of Part II explains the fundamental case in English law, R & B
Customs, in which the definition of “consumer” is not limited to a
natural person, but is expansive and applies unfair contract term
protection to all persons (legal or natural) dealing as consumers.
Subsection B focuses on how the CESL can be applied by
contracting parties. Subsection C will discuss relevant provisions in
addressing the exclusion of an implied warranty of merchantability
under the CESL in a B2B transaction. In Part III, the CESL, as
written, is applied to the facts of R & B Customs. Subsection A of
Part III shows that the parties can elect the CESL as the governing
law. Subsection B demonstrates how the definition of “consumer”
limits the protections offered under the CESL to the advantage of the
larger company. Subsection C of Part III shows that by applying the
CESL, the outcome of the dispute changes and results in
deregulation to the detriment of the SME. Lastly, Part IV offers
recommendations for altering the language provided in the CESL to
maintain domestic protections of SMEs when acting as consumers.

II. BACKGROUND
The CESL was proposed in October 2011 and has yet to be
adopted by the European Parliament. 25 Despite a general willingness
to adopt the CESL, 26 some practitioners fear that businesses will not
apply the CESL due to the lack of legal certainty in dealing with a
new instrument. 27 There are many questions yet to be answered about
24. R & B Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust, 1 W.L.R. 321,
321 (EWCA (Civ) 1988) (U.K.) (extending the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977
to a business dealing as a consumer).
25. See Press Release, European Lawyers Welcome Common European Sales
Law Proposal and Suggest Wider Scope, Council of Bars and Law Soc’ys of Eur.
(Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/
NTCdocument/EN_pr_0912pdf1_1349937593.pdf (citing broad support for the
CESL in the European legal community, and urging the European Parliament to
adopt the regulation).
26. See id. (noting that many lawyers not only support the CESL but believe
that the scope of the CESL should be expanded beyond what is currently
proposed).
27. See Posner, supra note 14, at 6 (describing that a major cost to the
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the CESL, but the European Commission’s Proposal lays out the
general application. 28 The language used by the drafters of the CESL
makes a clear distinction between B2B transactions and B2C
transactions.

A. SMES UNDER BRITISH LAW
The United Kingdom passed the Unfair Contract Terms Act
(“UCTA”) in 1977. 29 British case law interprets the UCTA to cover
businesses when dealing as a consumer. 30 Under the UCTA, a
business selling to a “person dealing as a consumer” cannot include
listed contract provisions deemed unfair that may otherwise be
included in a transaction with a person not dealing as a consumer. 31
In R & B Customs, the court extended consumer protection to a
small business. 32 R & B Customs Brokers (“R & B”) was a private
company owned by Mr. and Mrs. Roy Bell. 33 R & B was in the
business of shipping and freight forwarding and was conducting
business for five to six years before the transaction in dispute arose. 34
application of the CESL, and potentially a deterrent for many businesses, is the
uncertainty of how the CESL will be applied). But see Smits, supra note 16, at 18
(explaining that the uncertainty caused by the newness of the CESL is only a shortterm cost, which will diminish with time).
28. See generally The Proposal, supra note 5 (detailing how the CESL will
apply in both B2B and B2C cross-border transactions).
29. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c.50 (U.K.).
30. See id.; see also PAOLISA NEBBIA, UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPEAN
LAW: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE AND EC LAW 93 (2007) (noting that if an English
business does not act within its ordinary course of business, it may receive
consumer protection under the UCTA).
31. See, e.g., R & B Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust, 1
W.L.R. 321, 321–22 (EWCA (Civ) 1988) (U.K.) (expanding the protection of the
UCTA to an SME dealing as a consumer); see also Unfair Contract Terms Act §
6(2) (distinguishing between a person dealing as a consumer and a person not
dealing as a consumer, and noting that if a person is not dealing as a consumer, the
parties may exclude an implied warranty of merchantability).
32. See R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 331 (noting that the SME was
dealing outside its ordinary course of its business, and thus was acting as a
consumer under the UCTA); see also NEBBIA, supra note 30, at 93 (explaining that
the court in R & B Customs wanted to extend the protection of the UCTA as far as
possible).
33. See R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 323–24 (noting that Mr. Bell
and his wife were the only directors and owners of the company).
34. See id. (discussing the background for the dispute, the court noted that the
vehicle purchased was not part of the ordinary course of business, but rather was
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In 1984, R & B purchased a vehicle from Saunders Abbott Ltd.,
financed by defendant United Dominions Trust Ltd. (collectively
“United Dominions”). 35 United Dominions often engaged in this type
of triangular transaction with buyers. 36 Before signing, United
Dominions brought Mr. Bell’s attention to a provision in the standard
form contract that excluded an implied warranty of merchantability. 37
The standard form contract noted that the provision excluding the
implied warranty of merchantability only applied when the buyer
was not a consumer. 38 Mr. and Mrs. Bell had the opportunity to reject
the term, but they did not alter its terms and signed the contract as
drafted by United Dominions. 39
Shortly after acquiring the vehicle, Mr. Bell realized that the car
roof leaked. 40 Mr. Bell brought the defect to United Dominions’
attention and gave United Dominions several opportunities to cure
the defect. 41 Unfortunately, United Dominions was unable to cure the
defect and, in attempting to cure it, made the problem worse. 42 Mr.
Bell rejected the vehicle and demanded his money back, but United
Dominions refused, pointing to the provision that excluded an
implied warranty of merchantability when the buyer was not a
consumer. 43
The court of appeal found that the definition of consumer that
United Dominions relied upon was not in accordance with the
for both personal and business needs of the directors).
35. See id. at 324 (noting that this sort of “triangular relationship” is typical and
that the defendants engaged in the transaction frequently with both legal and
natural persons).
36. See id. (explaining that the defendants used standard form contracts for
both legal and natural persons with whom they conducted business).
37. See id. at 325–27 (describing that Mr. and Mrs. Bell purchased the vehicle
in the company’s name for ordinary use on English roads).
38. See id. at 328 (“The seller . . . does not let the goods subject to any
warranty or condition whether express or implied as to condition description
quality or merchantability for any particular purpose or at all.”); cf. Unfair Contract
Terms Act § 6(2) (mandating that in a contract with a person dealing as a
consumer, an implied warranty of merchantability cannot be excluded).
39. See R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 327 (noting that Mr. Bell
admitted to not reading the provision despite United Dominions drawing his
attention to the term).
40. See id. at 325.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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UCTA. 44 The UCTA does not limit consumer protection of unfair
contract terms to natural persons; rather, the UCTA uses the phrase
“a person dealing as a consumer.” 45 The court determined that where
a business is acting outside its ordinary course of business, by acting
outside its regular practice that is not an integral part of the business,
it is dealing as a consumer. 46 By acting as a consumer, the consumer
protection of the UCTA extends to the business. 47 Thus, the court
held that R & B was dealing as a consumer when purchasing the
vehicle and that United Dominions was subject to an implied
warranty of merchantability. 48

B. ELECTING TO APPLY THE CESL
If the CESL is adopted by the European Parliament, contracting
parties will have the option to apply the CESL as the governing law
of their agreement. 49 The drafters intend for the CESL to serve as a
44. See id. at 331 (explaining that although Mr. Bell had made two vehicle
purchases previously this did not meet the requisite degree of regularity for the
transaction to be considered part of R & B’s ordinary course of business, thus R &
B was dealing not as a business but as a consumer).
45. Unfair Contract Terms Act § 6(3)–(4) (providing protection to both legal
and natural persons dealing as a consumer); see also Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert
Reich, The Commission Proposal for a “Regulation on a Common European Sales
Law (CESL)” – Too Broad or not Broad Enough? 14 (EUI Working Papers, Paper
No. Law 2012/04) (comparing English, German, and French contract laws that use
a broader approach to the definition of consumer in regulations protecting
consumers).
46. See R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 329–31 (defining the term
“ordinary course of business” to mean an integral part of carrying on that business
by meeting a requisite degree of regularity, rather than any transaction an entity
may perform); see also NEBBIA, supra note 30, at 93 (arguing that the holding in R
& B Customs suggests that any transaction that is “merely incidental” to the
business does not meet the requirement of regularity to be considered part of the
ordinary course of business).
47. See, e.g., R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 328, 331 (holding that
where a business does not act within its ordinary course of business, it is dealing as
a consumer and receives the protection of the UCTA, which does not allow a seller
to exclude or restrict any “implied undertakings as to conformity of goods . . . as to
their quality or merchantability for a particular purpose”).
48. See id. at 331 (affirming the decision below, but also noting that in a
transaction between two businesses an exclusion of an implied warranty of
merchantability is not per se unreasonable).
49. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 25 (leaving the decision to apply the
CESL as the governing law to the individual parties); see also id. at 6 (“Where the
parties have agreed to use the Common European Sales Law, its rules will be the
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second national contract law, 50 and, if the parties choose the CESL as
the governing law, its law trumps domestic contract law. 51 When a
dispute arises, a national court addressing a transaction governed by
the CESL cannot defer to its own law if the provision is covered by
the CESL: the CESL is to stand alone and to be interpreted according
to its purpose and objective. 52 Unlike other EU private law
directives, the CESL is not applied as a base line that Member States
cannot go below but can modify by increasing regulation; rather, the
CESL applies as an autonomous contract regime and cannot be
modified to increase regulation. 53
To apply the CESL, contracting parties must be engaged in either
a B2C or B2B cross-border transaction. 54 One party to the agreement
must be from a Member State, 55 and the transaction must involve the
only national rules applicable for matters falling within its scope. Where a matter
falls within the scope of the Common European Sales Law, there is thus no scope
for the application of any other national rules.”); Micklitz & Reich, supra note 45
(discussing the difficulties parties will face in applying the CESL).
50. See Hesselink, The Case for a CESL, supra note 15, at 7–9 (noting that
throughout the debates in drafting the CESL, parties referred to the CESL as a
twenty-eighth contract regime; however, in its current proposal, the CESL is
presented as a second national regime). But see Smits, supra note 16, at 2–3
(questioning the need and demand for a “twenty-eighth” contract regime).
51. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 27 (explaining in Article 11 of the CESL
that by selecting the CESL, its law governs any dispute or circumstance that falls
within its scope without recourse to national law). But see Hesselink, The Case for
a CESL, supra note 15, at 16 (explaining that contract disputes that are not covered
by the CESL fall outside of its scope, and noting that it is uncertain which national
law will apply when the CESL is chosen to govern).
52. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 27 (explaining that a “consequence” of
choosing the CESL is that it governs without regard to domestic law); see also The
Proposal, supra note 5, at 33–34 (mandating that the CESL “be interpreted
autonomously and in accordance with its objectives and the principles underlying
it”).
53. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 4 (indicating that the CESL is to serve
as a second national contract regime); see also Micklitz & Reich, supra note 45, at
14.
54. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 26 (mandating that one party must be a
seller of goods or supplier of digital content and that one party must be a consumer
or an SME, defining an SME as a business that employs fewer than 250 people and
does not exceed fifty million Euro for annual turnover or forty-three million Euro
on its annual balance sheet, and implying that the SME can be either the seller or
buyer).
55. See id. at 25 (noting that, for a B2B transaction, one of the businesses must
have its principle place of business in a Member State, or, for a B2C transaction,
the consumer or the delivery address of the consumer must be located within a
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sale of goods, supply of digital content, or a service. 56 Lastly, the
parties must expressly agree to apply the CESL. 57

C. ASSESSING A PROVISION EXCLUDING AN IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF MERCHANTABILITY UNDER THE CESL
The CESL offers extensive protection to consumers, 58 but this
protection is limited by the definition of consumer provided in
Article 2(f). 59 The CESL is divided throughout its provisions into
either B2C or B2B transactions. 60 If a person in a transaction does
not qualify as a consumer and all other requirements are met, 61 the
transaction is treated as a B2B transaction and the extensive
consumer protections do not apply. 62 Unlike Member State contract
Member State).
56. See id. (limiting the application of the CESL certain sales transactions). But
see id. at 26 (prohibiting the use of the CESL in transactions that mix both sale of
goods and services or any other form of mixed contract).
57. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 26. Contra Hesselink, The Case for a
CESL, supra note 15, at 9 (arguing that the express mention that the CESL must
apply in its entirety to B2C transactions implies that parties to a B2B transaction
can choose which provisions of the CESL govern and claiming that the that the
CESL need not be expressly agreed upon in a B2B transaction).
58. See, e.g., The Proposal, supra note 5, at 68 (creating a lengthy list of
contract terms that are always unfair in B2C transactions in Article 84); see also
Heiderhoff, supra note 17, at 90 (explaining the extensive protection offered to
consumers, but noting that this may not be desirable for consumers because sellers
may increase the price of goods and services due to the sellers’ increased risk
under the CESL).
59. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 22 (defining a consumer as a natural
person and not a legal entity under Article 2(f)); see also Micklitz & Reich, supra
note 45, at 10, 12 (explaining that the narrow definition of consumer in the CESL
leads to decreased protection for those who may have qualified as consumers under
domestic contract law).
60. See, e.g., The Proposal, supra note 5, at 81 (mandating that the parties in a
B2C transaction abide by the provisions in Chapter 11 of the CESL addressing the
buyer’s remedies, but neglecting to mandate the provisions for B2B transactions).
Compare id. at 67–71 (heightening the protection of consumers from unfair
contract terms by including black and grey lists in Articles 82–85 regarding unfair
contract terms, thus creating a low threshold for proving that a contract term is
unfair in a B2C transaction), with id. at 71 (constructing a heightened standard in
Article 86 to prove a contract term is unfair in a B2B transaction).
61. See discussion infra Part II(B) (explaining that for a B2B transaction, the
CESL can only apply if one party to the transaction is an SME and if the parties
are located in different jurisdictions, one of which is a Member State).
62. See Loos, supra note 9 (expressing that in a B2B transaction where the
SME is a single individual and using the purchased object for both business and
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law, 63 any legal person acting or dealing as a consumer is prohibited
from receiving consumer status. 64
The definition of “consumer” in the CESL is drawn from the Draft
Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”) and the Unfair Contract
Terms Directive; 65 however, the drafters of the CESL narrow the
definition of “consumer” provided in the DCFR.66 The definition of
“consumer” provided in Article 2(f) limits consumer status to “any
natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside that
person’s trade, business, craft, or profession.” 67 The term “natural
person” excludes any SMEs, including sole proprietorships, from
consumer status. 68 The deliberate narrowing of the definition of
“consumer” and the use of the CESL as a second contract regime
limits the Member States from extending consumer protections
within the CESL to SMEs acting outside their ordinary course of
business. 69 SMEs will receive less protection than they would under
their domestic law due to this narrow definition. 70
personal use, the individual will not be protected).
63. See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 45, at 12–13 (listing Germany, France,
and England as jurisdictions, among others, that extend consumer protection to
persons other than natural persons).
64. See id. at 6–12.
65. See Draft Common Frame of Reference of 2009 (DCFR), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-private-law_en.pdf
(defining
consumer as a natural person primarily acting outside his trade, business, or
profession); see also Martijn W. Hesselink & Marco B.M. Loos, Unfair Contract
Terms in B2C Contracts 11 (Centre for the Study of Eur. Contract Law, Working
Paper No. 07, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies (noting
that the definition of consumer in the CESL comes from both the Unfair Contract
Terms Directive and the Draft Common Frame of Reference).
66. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 22 (providing in Article 2(f) that even a
natural person acting within his or her business or trade is not included in the
definition of consumer).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. See generally Loos, supra note 9 (noting that the limited definition of
consumer does not take into account that businesses come in all shapes and sizes
and that goods purchased by businesses can have dual purposes: business and
personal).
69. See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 45, at 12 (asserting that the CESL
contains a “fully harmonized definition” of consumer that does not allow Member
States to include persons that are excluded by the definition).
70. See id. at 13 (“By opting-in the CESL, consumers would ‘voluntarily’
abandon their protection in situations where Member State law contains a broader
definition of consumer.”). But see Allen & Overy’s Response, supra note 3, at 16
(emphasizing that the protective provisions provided by the CESL for both B2C
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Depending on how the transaction is classified (either a B2B or a
B2C), there are different mandatory and default rules for each
transaction governed by the CESL. 71 Chapter 11 of the CESL
addresses a buyer’s remedies in a transaction. 72 The provisions
within Chapter 11 are mandatory pursuant to Article 108, but the
mandatory nature is only expressly provided for in B2C
transactions. 73 The express mention of B2C transactions (and the
omission of B2B transactions in Article 108) provides that the parties
in a B2B transaction can derogate from Chapter 11 remedies. 74 Thus,
in a B2C transaction, the CESL specifically prohibits excluding an
implied warranty of merchantability to the detriment of the
consumer, 75 but parties engaged in B2B transactions can contract
around a buyer’s liability for lack of conformity of goods. 76
Unlike Chapter 11, the parties in a contract, whether B2B or B2C,
cannot derogate from any provision within Chapter 8, which
addresses unfair contract terms. 77 Chapter 8 of the CESL addresses
unfair contract terms for both B2C and B2B transactions, but, while
and B2B are unwarranted).
71. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 33 (highlighting that the first principle
of the CESL is the freedom to contract, but that freedom is subject to mandatory
provisions provided in the CESL).
72. See id. at 80–86 (outlining the remedies of a buyer in seven sections,
including the seller’s ability to cure and the right of the buyer to demand specific
performance).
73. See id. at 81 (“[T]he parties may not to the detriment of the consumer,
exclude the application of this chapter, or derogate from or vary [Chapter 11’s]
effect.”).
74. Cf. Martijn W. Hesselink, How to Opt Into the Common European Sales
Law? Brief Comments on the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation 8–9 (Centre
for the Study of Eur. Contract Law, Working Paper No. 15, 2011) [hereinafter
Hesselink, How to Opt Into the CESL] (reasoning that the express language of
Article 8, mandating that the CESL be adopted in its entirety in B2C transactions
“e contrario,” provides that the CESL can be “cherry picked” in B2B transactions).
75. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 81 (stating that a lack of conformity of a
good cannot be excluded by agreement if it is to the detriment of the consumer).
76. See id. (permitting parties in a B2B transaction to contract around
provisions listed in Chapter 11 of the CESL). Compare id. (distinguishing between
B2C transactions and B2B transactions in Article 108), with id. at 67 (making no
distinction in Article 81 between B2C and B2B transactions, but requiring that
Chapter 8 governing Unfair Contract Terms apply in its entirety to all
transactions).
77. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 67 (addressing unfair contract terms for
both B2B and B2C transactions, but noting that the section does not cover terms
that are addressed in other areas of the instrument).
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B2C transactions are covered extensively in four articles and thirtysix subsections, B2B contract terms are governed by a single article
with two subsections. 78
Article 86 is the single provision addressing unfair contract terms
in a B2B transaction, and it provides a two-prong test in determining
whether a contract term is unfair. 79 Article 86 states,
In a contract between traders, a contract term is unfair for the purposes of
this Section only if: (a) it forms part of not individually negotiated terms
within the meaning of Article 7; and (b) it is of such a nature that its use
grossly deviates from good commercial practice, contrary to good faith
and fair dealing. 80

First, the term within the contract must not be individually
negotiated as determined by Article 7. 81 A contract term is not
individually negotiated if it is supplied by one party and the other
party is not able to influence its content. 82 Where one party supplies a
selection of contract terms to the other party, a term is not to be
regarded as individually negotiated merely because the other party
chooses that term from the selection. 83 Typically, standard form

78. Compare id. at 67–71 (detailing and thoroughly listing transparency
requirements, contract terms that are always unfair, and contract terms that are
presumed to be unfair), with id. at 71 (explaining briefly that the nature of the term
cannot “grossly deviate . . . from good commercial practice, contrary to good faith
and fair dealing” and taking into account the nature of what is provided under the
contract, the circumstances at the signing of the contract, other contract terms, and
other contracts on which the contract at issue depends).
79. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 71 (providing that a contract term is
unfair if it is not individually negotiated and it grossly deviates from good
commercial practice).
80. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 67 (noting in Articles 80 and 81 that
Section 3 of Chapter 8 cannot be derogated and that Chapter 8 applies when no
other provision within the CESL governs the term that is in dispute).
81. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 71 (providing that a contract term is
unfair for the purposes of Section 3 only if “it forms part of not individually
negotiated terms within the meaning of Article 7”).
82. See id. at 34 (outlining that a contract term is not individually negotiated
when a party chooses one term from a selection of terms, and noting that the party
claiming that the term was individually negotiated bears the burden of proof); cf.
NEBBIA, supra note 30, at 118–20 (discussing the provision requiring that terms
found to be unfair under EU Directive 93/13 (regarding unfair contract terms in
B2C transactions) not be individually negotiated).
83. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 34.
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contracts are not individually negotiated, 84 and a party who claims
that a contract provision, which is part of a standard form contract,
was individually negotiated bears the burden of proof. 85 The
language of Article 7 suggests that a contract term can be considered
individually negotiated if a party has the opportunity to change the
standard language but does not. 86
If a term is determined to not be individually negotiated, a court
must address whether the term in dispute “grossly deviates from
good commercial practice, contrary to good faith and fair dealing.” 87
In determining whether there is a gross deviation from good faith and
fair dealing in a B2B transaction, the court must consider: (1) what is
provided under the contract; (2) the circumstances at the conclusion
of the contract; (3) the other contract terms; and (4) the terms of any
other contract that the contract in dispute depends upon. 88 As shown
by the application of other EU laws that attempt to harmonize EU
private law, Member States interpret EU laws autonomously; thus,
good faith is interpreted by referencing concepts under the governing
EU law and not domestic law. 89 Under the CESL, good faith and fair
84. See Aristides N. Hatzis, An Offer You Cannot Negotiate: Some Thoughts on
the Economics of Standard Form Consumer Contracts, in STANDARD CONTRACT
TERMS IN EUROPE: A BASIS FOR AND A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
43, 45, 49 (Hugh Collins ed. 2008) (explaining that standard form contracts are
appropriately referred to as “contracts of adhesion” in some countries because the
terms are not individually negotiated).
85. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 34 (applying the burden of proof to a
party claiming that the term was not individually negotiated in both B2C and B2B
transactions); see also id. at 22 (defining a “standard contract term” as one that is
drafted in advance for more than one transaction with different parties that is not
individually negotiated as set out in Article 7 of the CESL).
86. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 34; NEBBIA, supra note 30, at 116–18
(noting that whether a term is determined to be individually negotiated is not
always clear and depends on the facts and circumstances).
87. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 71 (applying a heightened standard for
finding that a term in a B2B transaction is an unfair contract term).
88. Compare id. (providing that in determining whether a factor grossly
deviates from good commercial practice, a court must give regard to the four
factors listed in B2B transactions), with id. at 68 (listing the same factors required
for a B2B transaction while adding a duty of transparency). The B2C transaction
also requires an assessment of the factors to find if there is a significant imbalance
between the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. Id.
89. See generally Simon Whittaker, Assessing the Fairness of Contract Terms:
The Parties’ Essential Bargain, Its Regulatory Context and the Significance of the
Requirement of Good Faith, 12 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 75
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dealing is to be applied as an objective standard that relies on open
and honest conduct. 90 Gross deviation from good faith and fair
dealing is a higher standard than that used for B2C transactions. 91
With no black and grey lists for B2B transactions, enumerating the
contract terms that are prohibited or are likely prohibited, and the
high standard of gross deviation, parties can freely contract and
implement terms that would otherwise be unfair under domestic
law. 92

III. ANALYSIS
Given the prevalence of transactions like that seen in R & B
Customs, it is likely the CESL will apply in a similar transaction
where the parties to the contract are located in different
jurisdictions. 93 Assuming the same facts as those presented in R & B
Customs, with the exception that R & B is located in a different
jurisdiction (not the UK), 94 the following analysis demonstrates how
the application of the CESL, as written in October 2011, will yield a
different result than that found under English law, a result that is
detrimental to R & B. The application of the CESL reduces the
(2004) (emphasizing that member states interpret “good faith” differently,
however, it should be interpreted within the meaning of the Directive or other
autonomous law that uses this language).
90. Cf. Hesselink & Loos, supra note 65, at 11 (noting that the language used
in the CESL regarding good faith and fair dealing in a B2C transaction connotes a
standard of conduct that is transparent and honest in consideration of the other
party and is drawn from the DCFR and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive).
91. See Loos, supra note 9 (noting that even having a standard for finding a
contract term unfair in a B2B transaction is controversial).
92. See id. (observing that domestic laws have started to protect against unfair
terms in B2B dealings).
93. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 25 (explaining that the CESL is to be
applied in cross-border transactions where the parties habitually live in different
countries, at least one of which is a Member State). But see id. at 18, 28
(emphasizing the hope of the Commission that individual Member States will alter
their domestic laws to mirror the CESL for other transactions to harmonize crossborder and internal transactions).
94. Cf. Flash Eurobarometer 320: European Contract Law in Business-toBusiness
Transactions,
GALLUP
ORG.
29
(2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_320_en.pdf
[hereinafter
Flash
Eurobarometer 320] (noting that SMEs interested in cross-border trade are
deterred from engaging in trade in part due to varying contract laws, but
emphasizing that SMEs showed a greater willingness to enter into cross-border
transactions with the implementation of a common European sales law).
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protection provided to R & B under domestic law, 95 and R & B,
unlike a consumer, is not shielded from contract terms that would
otherwise constitute unfair terms under domestic law. 96
This analysis is broken down into several subsections to
demonstrate how R & B will receive less protection in a transaction
governed by the CESL. The first subsection will describe how the
parties are able to apply the CESL as the governing law of the
contract. The second subsection will address the dispute as it arose in
R & B Customs and how the application of the CESL alters the
analysis to the disadvantage of R & B. Lastly, because the
transaction is a B2B transaction under the CESL, the contract term
excluding an implied warranty of merchantability will be assessed
for unfairness based on the two-prong test provided in Article 86,
thus yielding a different result than that found in R & B Customs.

A. R & B AND UNITED DOMINIONS CAN BE GOVERNED BY THE
CESL
The parties can select the CESL as the governing law of their
cross-border transaction if three requirements are met: (1) at least
one of the parties has a habitual residence in a Member State; 97 (2)
one of the businesses is an SME or a consumer; 98 and (3) the parties
are contracting for the sale of goods. 99 Here, United Dominions
operates its business in the United Kingdom, a Member State of the

95. See Loos, supra note 9 (highlighting that protection provided to an SME in
domestic law is reduced in some areas of contract law by the CESL).
96. Compare The Proposal, supra note 5, at 68–70 (creating comprehensive
black and grey lists that apply in B2C transactions), with id. at 67, 71 (denying the
extensive protections listed for B2C transactions for use in B2B transactions).
97. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 25 (mandating that at least one party
must be from a Member State, whether a habitual residence for a consumer or a
principle place of business for a trader, and implying that the other party does not
have to also be part of a Member State).
98. See id. at 26 (describing qualified parties to a transaction governed by the
CESL and defining SMEs as traders that “employ . . . fewer than 250 persons; and
ha[ve] an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million or an annual balance
sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million, or, for an SME which has its habitual
residence in a Member State whose currency is not the euro or in a third country,
the equivalent amounts in the currency of that Member State or third country”).
99. See id. at 25–26 (applying the CESL in transactions for the sale of goods,
digital content, or services).
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European Union, and R & B is not located in the United Kingdom. 100
Secondly, R & B is a business that is owned by a husband and wife
and does not employ more than 250 people or exceed EUR 50
million in annual turnover, thus meeting the requirement to qualify
as an SME under the CESL. 101 Lastly, the parties are contracting for
the sale of a vehicle. 102 The requirements for the parties to apply the
CESL exist in this cross-border transaction. 103

B. UNDER THE CESL, R & B IS NOT A CONSUMER
The CESL permits United Dominions to create a standard form
contract, as United Dominions did in R & B Customs, which can be
used in multiple jurisdictions without conforming to the individual
Member State contract laws. 104 The ability to use this uniform
standard contract with SMEs in other jurisdictions will ease the
expense and complexity of cross-border transactions for United
Dominions and the contracting SMEs. 105 However, by agreeing to
choose the CESL over British law to govern the transaction, R & B
loses the protection it would otherwise receive from domestic
regulation. 106
There is a trend for SMEs to use the contract law preferred by the
100. See id. at 25 (requiring that in a transaction between two traders at least one
of the traders has its principal place of business in a Member State, whether or not
that trader is the SME).
101. See R & B Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust, 1 W.L.R. 321,
323–24 (EWCA (Civ) 1988) (U.K.); see also The Proposal, supra note 5, at 26
(mandating that where both parties to a transaction are traders, one must be an
SME as defined in the CESL, and noting that the SME need not be from a Member
State if the other trader is from a Member State).
102. R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 324.
103. See generally Hesselink, How to Opt Into the CESL, supra note 74
(describing how the CESL is an optional agreement and that the parties must meet
certain requirements and agree to apply the CESL as the governing law).
104. See EU to Simplify Cross-Border Trade Rules, EURONEWS (Sept. 19,
2012), http://www.euronews.com/2012/09/17/eu-to-simplify-cross-border-traderules (explaining that the CESL was drafted to boost “cross border trade, cut costs,
and give customers greater choice”).
105. See, e.g., Flash Eurobarometer 320, supra note 94 (explaining that many
businesses forego cross-border transactions because of the legal costs of
interpreting and complying with different contract laws).
106. See Hesselink & Loos, supra note 65, at 10 (electing to use the CESL
means that parties to B2C transactions cannot modify the provisions on unfair
contract terms).
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larger company when engaging in cross-border transactions. 107 R &
B, a two-person business that engaged in only two other similar
transactions, had a weaker bargaining position than United
Dominions, a company that engages in this type of transaction as its
ordinary course of business. 108 Following the trend of SMEs yielding
to the contract law preferred by the larger company, R & B will
likely agree to the contract being governed by the law preferred by
United Dominions. As for United Dominions, it is likely that it will
prefer the CESL as the governing law of its contract for legal
certainty and the ability to exclude an implied warranty of
merchantability in a B2B transaction.
The CESL creates a more certain outcome for both parties, but at
the expense of R & B and to the benefit of United Dominions. 109
When dealing with R & B (or any other SME), United Dominions
wants to exclude any implied warranty of merchantability. 110 An
SME can remain protected under its own governing law or that of its
trading partner if acting as a consumer, 111 but, by using the CESL as
the governing law, United Dominions can avoid the domestic
regulations that benefit R & B when acting as a consumer because R

107. See Loos, supra note 9 (stating that in contracts between an SME and larger
company, the SME is typically forced to use the law that is preferred by the larger
company because the term “consumer is so restricted that buyers in the case of a
dual purpose contract fall short of . . . consumer protection rules”).
108. See Martijn W. Hesselink, Unfair Terms in Contracts Between Businesses
2–4 (Centre for the Study of Eur. Contract Law, Working Paper No. 07, 2011)
(discussing that where an SME is not as familiar with the transaction as a larger
company, the SME is in a similar situation to that of a consumer and, therefore, has
less bargaining power than the larger company). See generally GINTAUTAS ŠULIJA,
STANDARD CONTRACT TERMS IN CROSS-BORDER BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2011)
(explaining that courts notice and mention weaker bargaining, but that this
inequality does not render a contract to be unfair where there are disparate
bargaining powers between businesses).
109. Compare The Proposal, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that a goal of the CESL
is to reduce transaction costs and create more certainty in cross-border
transactions), with Hesselink & Loos, supra note 65 (stating that SMEs will have
to give up protective domestic regulations when contracting under the CESL).
110. R & B Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust, 1 W.L.R. 321,
328 (EWCA (Civ) 1988) (U.K.).
111. See discussion infra Part II(A) (explaining the holding of the court in R & B
Customs extending the protection of the UCTA to a business dealing as a
consumer).
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& B is never a consumer under the CESL. 112
The definition of “consumer” in the CESL is clear. 113 It provides
that a “‘consumer’ means any natural person.” 114 The CESL extends
extensive protections in B2C transactions, but the protections are
limited to natural persons acting outside the scope of their trade or
business. 115 Mr. and Mrs. Bell signed the contract with United
Dominions in the company’s name acting outside its ordinary course
of business. 116 Although R & B was acting outside the ordinary
course of its business, the CESL automatically excludes R & B from
consumer status since it is not a legal person. 117 A court determining
a CESL-governed dispute would classify the transaction as a B2B
transaction, thus allowing United Dominions to exclude an implied
warranty of merchantability. 118
In a B2C transaction governed by the CESL, a seller cannot
exclude an implied warranty of merchantability; 119 however, this
protection is provided to consumers, 120 and R & B is not a consumer
112. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 27 (mandating that, where the parties
elect to use the CESL, the CESL governs over any other law); cf. Oren Bar-Gill
and Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique
of European Consumer Contract Law 28 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Working Papers,
Paper No. 298, 2012), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/298 (discussing
B2C transactions and how sellers will use the CESL to avoid jurisdictions that
have more regulated contract law).
113. See Loos, supra note 9 (comparing the definition of consumer in the Draft
Frame of Reference and the CESL and finding no intent by the drafters to expand
the definition to apply to legal persons despite the proposals made when drafting
the Draft Frame of Reference).
114. The Proposal, supra note 5, at 22.
115. Compare id. at 67–71 (creating black and grey lists of unfair contract terms
that apply in B2C transactions), with id. at 22 (limiting the definition of consumer
to natural persons and excluding legal persons).
116. See R & B Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust, 1 W.L.R. 321,
324 (EWCA (Civ) 1988) (U.K.).
117. See Hesselink & Loos, supra note 65 (describing the limited definition of
consumer in the CESL, thus forcing SMEs to give up domestic protections).
118. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 81 (providing that in a B2B transaction,
the parties can derogate from the provisions governing an implied warranty of
merchantability under Chapter 11 of the CESL).
119. See id. (mandating that the seller not exclude a “lack-of-conformity”
provision to the detriment of the buyer in a B2C transaction).
120. See Bettina Heiderhoff, CESL – A Chance for True Freedom of Contract
for the Consumer, in PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN GERMANY AND POLAND AND IN THE
COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW 77, 90 (Tim Drygala el al. eds., 2012) (noting
that under the CESL “the consumer is put in paradise”).
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under the CESL. 121 United Dominions benefits from the deregulation
created by the CESL. 122 Knowing that the CESL does not regulate
unfair contract terms in B2B transactions as domestic contract law
does, United Dominions will prefer the CESL as its governing law in
B2B transactions. 123
Acting as a consumer and in a weaker bargaining position than
United Dominions, if R & B wants to engage in cross-border trade, it
will likely agree to the terms provided by United Dominions.124
United Dominions, with greater bargaining power, will push for the
CESL over domestic law to govern the transaction to avoid a
regulation that would favor R & B. 125 R & B will relinquish the
protection offered under domestic regulation (both in the United
Kingdom and its own jurisdiction) in exchange for the transaction. 126
By preferring and electing the CESL, United Dominions is able to
avoid a regulation that is in favor of R & B. 127 Where the transaction
in R & B Customs was considered closer to a B2C transaction
because R & B was determined to be “dealing as a consumer,” 128
121. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 22 (providing that a consumer is a
natural person only); see also Loos, supra note 9 (explaining that the drafters of
the CESL narrowed the definition of consumer even further than in the DCFR).
122. See Loos, supra note 9 (explaining that the limited definition of the
consumer will serve as a detriment to SMEs, which, in this case, must accept the
terms favorable to United Dominions).
123. See Posner, supra note 14; cf. Allen & Overy’s Response, supra note 3, at
11 (emphasizing that their clients (businesses) “typically prefer clear rules over
general principles since they want to know in a given circumstance that their
contract will be binding”).
124. See Loos, supra note 9.
125. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in
Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law 124–25
(N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 298, 2012), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/298 (mentioning that a business may use the CESL
to its advantage to avoid more restrictive domestic regulations).
126. See Hesselink & Loos, supra note 65 (noting that the scope of the CESL
and the limited definition of consumer could serve as an invitation for companies
to apply the CESL to avoid domestic regulations).
127. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 27 (mandating that where the parties
select the CESL as the governing law, that law trumps national law).
128. See R & B Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust, 1 W.L.R. 321,
328 (EWCA (Civ) 1988) (U.K.) (outlining three conditions to be considered
“dealing as a consumer”: (1) the party that deals as a consumer does not present
himself as dealing as a business; (2) the other party makes the contract in the
ordinary course of his business; (3) in the case for a sale of goods, the good sold is
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under the CESL, the transaction between United Dominions and R &
B will receive B2B transaction status. 129 Although R & B made a
purchase that was “merely incidental” to its business activities, it is a
legal person and will not receive consumer status under the CESL. 130
By opting into the CESL, United Dominions is able to avoid
protections offered by British law to its trading partners. 131

C. EXCLUSION OF AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
UNDER THE CESL
Suppose now that the parties are aware that R & B is not a
consumer under the CESL, and United Dominions and R & B
expressly agree that the CESL will govern their contract. 132 Choosing
the CESL as the governing law alleviates uncertainty about the status
of R & B as a consumer, and, when a dispute arises regarding the
exclusion of an implied warranty of merchantability, 133 the court
hearing the complaint will apply the CESL. 134 By applying the
CESL, the court will come to a different conclusion than the decision
reached under British contract law.
The court will first establish that the transaction is between two

that normally sold for private use or consumption).
129. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 22 (limiting the provisions within the
CESL that govern B2C transactions to traders dealing with natural persons acting
outside the scope of their trade or business).
130. See NEBBIA, supra note 30, at 76 (describing the holding of R & B Customs
and noting that a transaction that is not an integral part of the ordinary course of
business can give rise to consumer protection).
131. See Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in
Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law 124
(N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 298, 2012), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/298.
132. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 26. But see Hesselink, How to Opt Into
the CESL, supra note 74, at 8–9 (arguing that the combination of Article 30 and
Article 58 of the CESL allow for the interpretation that the parties could imply
without expressly agreeing that the CESL govern the contract).
133. See R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 328 (dividing the provision
excluding an implied warranty of merchantability into two sections: consumer and
non-consumer).
134. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 27 (explaining that when the CESL
governs, it trumps national law when a provision in the CESL directly addresses
the issue in dispute); see also id. at 33 (instructing that the CESL is to be
interpreted “autonomously and in accordance with its objectives and the principles
underlying it”).
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traders. 135 Once the court establishes that the transaction is between
two traders (one of which is an SME), the dispute between United
Dominions and R & B will be assessed under provisions governing
B2B transactions. 136 In a B2B transaction, contract terms that are
claimed to be unfair, and not expressly addressed in a different
Chapter of the CESL, are governed by Article 86, which sets a high
standard requiring a gross deviation from good commercial practice,
contrary to good faith and fair dealing. 137 To the disadvantage of R &
B, the dispute between United Dominions and R & B yields a
different result under the CESL: the CESL effectively deregulates
protections set in place by Member States’ contract law. 138 The
contract term excluding the implied warranty of merchantability does
not qualify as an unfair contract term under the CESL.
The implied warranty of merchantability that United Dominions
and R & B agreed to exclude in the contract would not be stricken
from the contract as an unfair term under the CESL. 139 As described
above, R & B is a legal person, and although acting as a consumer, it
does not qualify as a consumer. 140 Because R & B does not qualify as
a consumer, it does not receive the advanced protection of Section 2
of Chapter 8 nor does Article 108 apply. 141 The parties contracted
135. See generally The Proposal, supra note 5 (dividing the provisions within
the CESL into provisions that govern B2C transactions and B2B transactions).
136. See generally Allen & Overy’s Response, supra note 3 (questioning how
the Commission proposes to handle close calls of when a business is or is not an
SME).
137. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 71 (requiring that the court take into
account four factors when deciding whether a term grossly deviates from good
faith and fair dealing: the nature of what is to be provided in the contract; the
circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract; other contract terms; and
any other contract that the contract in dispute depends upon). See generally
NEBBIA, supra note 30 (assessing unfair contract term interpretation in Europe
with a focus on England and Italy).
138. Cf. Loos, supra note 9 (noting that using the CESL renders national rules
on sales contracts concerning unfair contract terms inapplicable).
139. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 67 (“Where the contract can be
maintained without the unfair contract term, the other contract terms remain
binding.”).
140. See discussion infra Part III(B) (applying the definition of consumer to R &
B when it acted as a consumer).
141. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 67–71 (creating black and grey lists of
unfair contract terms to protect consumers in B2C transactions); id. at 81
(mandating that an implied warranty of merchantability not be excluded in B2C
transactions to the detriment of the consumer); see also Hesselink & Loos, supra
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around Chapter 11 of the CESL, which is permitted under Article
108 of the CESL. 142 R & B would have to argue that the contract
term meets the requirements set out in Article 86 deeming the
exclusion to be an unfair contract provision. 143 Under Article 86, a
contract term is deemed unfair if it meets two requirements: (1) the
contract term is not an individually negotiated term, and (2) the
nature of the term “grossly deviates from good commercial practice,
contrary to good faith and fair dealing.” 144 These requirements will
be addressed in turn.
1. Individual Negotiation of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Contract Term between R & B and United Dominion Is Irrelevant
Under the CESL
An unfair contract term in a B2B transaction is only unfair if it
meets the first criterion that the term was not individually
negotiated. 145 The standard set out in Article 7, referenced by Article
86, mandates that the party presented with the standard form have the
ability to “influence” the provision. 146 Because the contract between
United Dominions and R & B was a standard form contract, United
Dominions bears the burden of showing that the term was
individually negotiated. 147 The facts presented in R & B Customs are
unclear as to whether the parties individually negotiated the
note 65 at 9 (“Chapter 8 . . . consists of 8 articles: section 1 (art. 79–81) applies to
all contracts which are governed by the Common European Sales Law, section 2
(art. 82–85) applies only to contracts between a trader and consumer . . . section 3
(art. 86) applies only to contract where both parties are traders . . . .”); Loos, supra
note 9.
142. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 80–86 (addressing the buyer’s remedies
for non-performance and lack of conformity, but failing to include an express
provision that parties in B2B transactions cannot contract around the provisions,
which, when read with the inclusion of the provision for B2C transactions, results
in the ability to contract around the provisions regarding lack of conformity of
goods in a B2B transaction governed by the CESL).
143. See id. at 67 (explaining that contract terms deemed to be unfair are not
binding on the parties and that Chapter 8 of the CESL only applies if another
Chapter of the CESL does not govern the status of the term included in the
contract).
144. Id. at 71.
145. See id. at 34, 71.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 34 (placing the burden of proof on the party that supplied the
standard form contract to show that the term at issue was individually negotiated).
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provision. 148 However, whether or not the terms were individually
negotiated does not alter the outcome of the decision under the CESL
in favor of United Dominions.
For example, if United Dominions is able to show that the terms of
the contract were individually negotiated because R & B’s attention
was brought to the provision and it arguably had the ability to alter
the provision, then the term does not qualify as an unfair contract
term. 149 By not meeting this initial threshold, R & B would be bound
by the terms of the agreement and not be able to strike the
provision. 150 On the other hand, because the parties used a standard
contract, United Dominions bears the burden of proof to show that
the term was individually negotiated. 151 Arguably United Dominions
would not meet this burden because R & B did not “influence” the
terms of the provision. 152 If United Dominions is unable to convince
the court that drawing a party’s attention to a provision in its
standard form contract constitutes an individually negotiated term, 153
then the analysis would continue to the second prong that requires

148. See R & B Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust, 1 W.L.R. 321,
327 (EWCA (Civ) 1988) (U.K.) (noting that the parties do not question the manner
in which R & B was made aware of the provision excluding the implied warranty
of merchantability, but also mentioning that Mr. Bell emphasized that he did not
read the provision despite it being brought to his attention).
149. See Loos, supra note 9 (noting that the CESL regarding individually
negotiated terms follows the provisions within the Unfair Terms Directive, and that
if the term is found to be individually negotiated the unfairness analysis does not
apply).
150. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 27 (outlining that the consequence of
electing the CESL is that its terms govern over national contract law). But see
Hesselink & Loos, supra note 65 (noting that when a term is not deemed to be
unfair a court may use the national law addressing immorality to strike a
provision).
151. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 34 (outlining in Article 7(3) that the
party claiming a term in a standard form contract was individually negotiated bears
the burden of proof); see also Loos, supra note 9 (noting that Article 7 places the
burden of proof on the party claiming that a term is individually negotiated, and
emphasizing that this requirement is not met when one party describes the
provision to the other party).
152. Cf. The Proposal, supra note 5, at 34 (explaining that a term in a contract is
not individually negotiated if the provision is provided by one party and the other
party does not have the ability to alter its content).
153. See NEBBIA, supra note 30 (noting that this questioning by the court
regarding the ability to negotiate over standard form contracts is often a concern
that touches on the unequal bargaining power between the parties).
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the term to be a gross deviation from good commercial practice,
contrary to good faith and fair dealing. 154
2. The Contract Provision Does Not Grossly Deviate From
Standards of Good Commercial Practice, Contrary to Good Faith
and Fair Dealing
The high standard applied to B2B transactions under Article
86(1)(b) of the CESL would not be met in the transaction between R
& B and United Dominions, and the decision by the court would
result in United Dominions effectively avoiding national regulation.
For a court to find a provision in a B2B transaction unfair, the
contract provision must “grossly deviate from good commercial
practice, contrary to good faith and fair dealing,” a heightened
standard compared to that provided for B2C contract terms under the
CESL. 155 Good faith and fair dealing is a defined term within the
CESL: “a standard of conduct characterized by honesty, openness
and consideration for the interests of the other party.” 156 Courts
interpreting a dispute may not settle an issue by referring to their
national law, and Article 86 requires courts to address four areas
regarding the contractual relationship. 157 Following the “objectives
154. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 71 (requiring that the courts address
both whether the term was individually negotiated and if it was in line with good
faith and fair dealing in a B2B transaction).
155. Compare id. at 67–71 (providing extensive, comprehensive protection to
consumers in B2B transactions), with id. at 71 (requiring courts to exclude the
guidance offered in B2C transactions regarding unfair contracts and look at the
contract through a different lens that mandates a heightened standard).
156. The Proposal, supra note 5, at 22. Compare BEALE, supra note 8, at 812
(noting that the standard of good faith in accordance with unfair contract terms was
traditionally interpreted according to the law of the nation state), with The
Proposal, supra note 5, at 27 (mandating that, where the parties opt into the CESL,
the CESL trumps national law when the provision is expressly addressed in the
CESL). See generally Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmerman, Good Faith in
European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 7 (Reinhard Zimmerman & Simon Whittaker eds.,
2000) (explaining that the consumer protection directive has implemented good
faith in Member States and the Member States have developed their own
jurisprudence on how to interpret the term).
157. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 33–34 (“Issues within the scope of the
Common European Sales Law but not expressly settled by it are to be settled in
accordance with the objectives and the principles underlying it and all its
provisions, without recourse to the national law that would be applicable in the
absence of an agreement to use the Common European Sales Law or to any other
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and principles” of the CESL, such as its emphasis on freedom to
contract and the express exclusion of SMEs from consumer status, 158
a court assessing the required factors laid out in the CESL would find
that the exclusion of an implied warranty of merchantability in the
transaction between R & B and United Dominions is not unfair.
After establishing that the transaction is a B2B transaction and that
the term is not individually negotiated, the court would address four
factors: (1) “the nature of what is to be provided under the contract”;
(2) “the circumstances prevailing during the conclusion of the
contract”; (3) “the other contract terms”; and (4) “the terms of any
other contract on which the contract depends.” 159 Applying the same
logic as applied in R & B Customs to assess the transaction here, R &
B is purchasing a car from Saunders Abbott, which is financed by
United Dominions. 160 The nature of what is provided under the
contract is a vehicle and financing, a typical contractual
relationship. 161 To the second factor, during the conclusion of the
contract R & B was made aware of the contract provision excluding
the implied warranty of merchantability and was arguably allowed
the opportunity to object to the provision.162 What is more, R & B
made similar purchases in the past on credit terms, thus it was not a
new transaction to the business. 163 Thirdly, the other contract terms
law.”) (emphasis added).
158. See id. at 33 (emphasizing that the first general principle of the CESL is
that parties are free to contract and determine their relationship, and providing that
any provision not mandated within the CESL may be contracted around); see also
id. at 22 (limiting the definition of consumer to natural persons operating outside
their trade or business). But see CHANTAL MAK, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: A COMPARISON OF THE IMPACT OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS ON CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS IN GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS,
ITALY AND ENGLAND 5–6 (2008) (noting that jurisdictions throughout Europe
emphasize the freedom to contract but set limits to that freedom on moral, social,
and good faith grounds).
159. The Proposal, supra note 5, at 71.
160. See R & B Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust, 1 W.L.R. 321,
324 (EWCA (Civ) 1988) (U.K.) (noting that the transaction at issue was not the
first transaction that R & B had done).
161. See id. (identifying that this was a common and long-standing relationship
between the defendants and the third party dealership).
162. See id. at 325 (remarking that there was no deceit on the part of United
Dominions regarding the provision excluding an implied warranty of
merchantability).
163. See id. (indicating that R & B was familiar with this sort of transaction but
not explaining if the transaction had occurred between the same parties in the past).
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are not in dispute and are part of the standard form contract to
finance the purchase of a vehicle. 164 Lastly, the contractual
relationship was set out in one document. 165
The factors considered and the objective of the CESL to keep B2B
transactions separate from B2C transactions will result in the court
having to hold in favor of United Dominions. 166 The factors do not
include a question about unequal bargaining power, and, no matter
its size or sophistication, R & B is on its own and cannot rely on
national law regulation that would serve to protect it.167 There was no
egregious behavior in the transaction that would qualify the
provision as grossly deviating from “conduct characterized by
honesty, openness and consideration for the interests of the other
party.” 168 R & B was made aware of the provision, and United
Dominions made several attempts to cure the defect. 169 However,
here, United Dominions protected itself by excluding the implied
warranty of merchantability, which it showed to R & B before the
conclusion of the contract. 170 R & B, as a legal person, does not
receive the protection that is offered to consumers under the CESL,
and its relationship with United Dominions is governed by the terms

164. See id. at 324, 328 (explaining that the company purchased the vehicle in
its name for business purposes).
165. See id. (noting that the only other document that R & B completed was a
credit application form, which bears little to no determinative value for assessing if
the contract provision is against good commercial practice).
166. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 33 (mandating that the CESL be
interpreted according to its objectives and principles without recourse to domestic
law).
167. See id. at 71 (excluding bargaining power as a factor to consider when
addressing unfair contract terms in B2B transaction); see also Allen & Overy’s
Response, supra note 3, at 11 (“[B]ecause CESL is autonomous . . . , even in
Member States where the concept of good faith is refined, the case law will
presumably be of little assistance.”).
168. Compare The Proposal, supra note 5, at 22 (defining good faith and fair
dealing as open and honest conduct that considers the interest of the other party),
with R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 331 (noting that an exclusion of an
implied warranty of merchantability in a different transaction would not be
necessarily per se unreasonable).
169. See R & B Customs Brokers Co., 1 W.L.R. at 327 (remarking that United
Dominions drew Mr. and Mrs. Bell’s attention to the provision excluding a
warranty of merchantability).
170. See id. (explaining that Mr. Bell admitted to being made aware of the
provision, but not reading the provision before signing the agreement).

284

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:1

for which it freely contracted. 171 British contract law cannot protect R
& B when the transaction is governed by the CESL, 172 and the
outcome of R & B Customs changes. What would be an unfair
contract term under domestic law becomes an acceptable term when
the contracting parties opt into the CESL, thus resulting in
deregulation.

IV. THE CESL LANGUAGE SHOULD BE ALTERED
TO PROTECT SMES
The goal of the Commission in drafting the CESL was to create a
stronger internal market by removing complexities that hinder SMEs
from engaging in cross-border transactions. 173 However, as written,
the CESL will deprive SMEs of protection that their jurisdictions
offer. 174 For fear of losing the protection offered to them, SMEs may
continue to forego cross-border transactions. 175 Losing the protection
offered under domestic law can be as costly for the SME as not
engaging in cross-border transactions, and, for fear of losing
domestic protection, businesses may refrain from cross-border
transactions as they have in the past. 176 To avoid this result, the
language of the CESL should be altered. 177
171. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 33 (providing that parties are free to
contract in the first article of the CESL).
172. See id. at 33–34 (stating that when the CESL is chosen as governing law,
domestic law does not apply).
173. See id. at 2–4 (listing the objectives of the Commission, including making
cross-border transactions easier on SMEs which in turn will improve the internal
market).
174. See Loos, supra note 9 (noting that the restrictive definition of consumer
will force SMEs or a natural person acting outside his or her trade or business to
give up the protections offered by domestic contract law).
175. Cf. Flash Eurobarometer 320, supra note 94 (explaining that microenterprises were the most deterred from entering into cross-border transactions due
to costs of navigating different contract laws).
176. See id. (indicating that many businesses currently refrain from cross-border
transactions due to the expense of dealing with foreign jurisdiction contract
regimes).
177. See Bettina Heiderhoff, CESL – A Chance for Truer Freedom of Contract
for the Consumer, in PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN GERMANY AND POLAND AND IN THE
COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW 77, 94 (Tim Drygala et al. eds., 2012) (“[T]he
chance should be taken to make the CESL something special. It has the
opportunity to become a truly innovative project which might be attractive to . . .
market players.”).
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The language of the CESL could be changed in three different
ways to avoid the deregulation of protection for SMEs. First, the
definition of consumer could be expanded to match that of the
UCTA. 178 By broadening the definition to include “any persons
dealing as a consumer,” the CESL would extend the protections that
it offers to consumers to SMEs dealing as consumers. Thus SMEs
would be less hesitant to engage in cross-border transactions, larger
businesses would still be able to save costs by using a uniform
contract law, and the Commission would be better able to pursue its
goals of improving the internal market. 179
However, if expanding the definition raises concerns about
certainty and protection as being too broad for SMEs, the CESL
could include black and grey lists of what are unfair contract terms
and what are presumed to be unfair contract terms. 180 By listing what
provisions are unfair and likely considered to be unfair, businesses
(both large and small) would have more certainty of the outcome if a
dispute arose under the contract. 181 Businesses could create standard
form contracts that avoided these terms and, if they did not avoid the
presumptively unfair terms, take the appropriate steps to prepare for
any dispute that may arise to justify the use of the term.
Thirdly, in particular for the exclusion of an implied warranty of
merchantability, the Commission could extend the mandatory nature
of Chapter 11 of the CESL for B2C transactions to B2B
transactions. 182 By doing so, parties in B2B transactions would still
have the freedom to contract, but the parties would not be able to
exclude an implied warranty of merchantability. 183 This solution is
178. See Unfair Contract Terms Act §12 (defining consumer as any person
dealing as a consumer) (emphasis added).
179. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 3–4 (acknowledging that SMEs are
often forced to agree to the terms provided by a larger company and emphasizing
its goal that the CESL ease costs for SMEs and improve the internal market).
180. See id. at 68–70 (providing lists of terms that are always unfair and terms
that are presumptively unfair).
181. See Posner, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that a primary obstacle for
businesses and consumers in applying the CESL is the uncertainty of how disputes
will be resolved under its provisions).
182. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 81 (mandating that the parties in a B2C
transaction not derogate from the provisions in Chapter 11, but permitting parties
in B2B transactions to contract around these provisions).
183. See id. (prohibiting a party from excluding an implied warranty of
merchantability to the detriment of the consumer).
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particular to the results of R & B Customs, and there may be other
concerns regarding unfair contract terms that would arise and again
result in deregulation.
Two other mechanisms that scholars suggest are for (1) domestic
courts to apply a standard of immorality to contracts, and (2) the
Commission to change the structure of the CESL from an optional
instrument to a directive for minimum harmonization.184 These
suggestions would potentially avoid the deregulation of consumer
protection for SMEs, but they would frustrate the Commission’s goal
of creating a uniform contract law that can be applied at low cost and
high certainty. 185

V. CONCLUSION
The decision in R & B Customs held that an SME could receive
consumer protection when dealing as a consumer, but if the CESL is
applied to the same circumstances in R & B Customs, the outcome
changes to the detriment of the SME. The application of the CESL in
B2B transactions results in deregulation of Member State law. Larger
businesses may insist upon the CESL when dealing with SMEs to
avoid the domestic law that has a broader definition of “consumer.”
The heightened standard for an SME to prove that a contract term is
unfair in a B2B transaction under the CESL does not protect the
SME when dealing as a consumer. SMEs may continue to forego
cross-border trading as a result of this aspect of deregulation, and the
Commission’s goals will be frustrated.

184. See Loos, supra note 9 (noting that the normal instrument for the
Commission to apply is a minimum harmonization directive that the Member
States can augment as they see fit); see also Hesselink, The Case for a CESL,
supra note 15, at 16 (expressing that the immorality standards of jurisdictions
could be applied since the CESL does not address moral standards).
185. See The Proposal, supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that transaction costs due
to different contract laws of the Member States create barriers to cross-border
transactions that cost the internal market tens of billions of Euros).

